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Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to analyse how in Saudi Arabia’s perception the Muslim Brotherhood went 
from being a political asset to a security threat for the Kingdom. It does so by examining the 
reoccurring historical (in)security elements of the regime in order to understand why they are 
perceived as a threat. By examining the origin and ideology of the Brotherhood we gain an 
understanding on how the organization can pose a threat.  
The time period examined in this work includes the modern history of Saudi Arabia, leading up to 
March 2014 when Saudi Arabia officially classified the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organization. The work has been conducted through a qualitative analysis of the empirics on which 
the theory of Securitization has been applied. The empirics have been gathered from academic 
literature, newspapers and articles.   
    What has been shown is that that the Kingdom does not solely perceive its regime survival from a 
materialistic balance of power perspective, but rather from a broader and more inclusive. The 
security of Saudi Arabia has been not to balance neighbouring interests, but rather to walk a line of 
managing internal and international interests in order to maintain the primacy of the monarchical 
family and its interests. By applying the theory of Securitization, this dissertation analyses how the 
mutual accommodation between Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood altered under 
politicized and later securitized religion.  
Keywords: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The Muslim Brotherhood, Securitization, Security.  
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1 Introduction 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has since its creation been the protector of the two holiest 
places of Islam, Mecca and Medina. This has given them great ideological and religious influence 
in the Muslim world. Whether openly or through Islamic charity organizations the regime has 
financially supported widely different groups, from; the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet invasion, to the March 14 political coalition in Lebanon in efforts to spread their version of 
Islam, Wahhabism, or to counterbalance the influence of other states. One of the major receivers of 
Saudi support has been the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), who fleeing oppression in Egypt under 
President Nasser arrived in the Kingdom during the 1950s. There they established themselves and 
came to dominate the intellectual scene. Starting to fuse the teaching of Sheik Abdul Wahhab and 
teachings of the MB, leading to what is known as the Tayyar al-Sahawi (religious awakening.)1 This 
doctrine established itself as the dominant one, and led to the intellectual discourse of the last 30 
years to become “static” owning to the overt domination of MB thought in the Kingdom.  
    With the ousting of Mubarak’s regime in 2011, we witnessed the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
into mainstream politics in Egypt. With the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) winning a landslide 
election under the auspice of the MB, positioning their candidate as the first, post authoritarian, 
elected President. During the popular uprising, thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to express 
a plurality of causes, the most dominant one being the request for Mubarak to step down from his 
30 year Presidency. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia bemoaned the fall of Mubarak and worked 
extensively against the imminent rise of the MB, quickly tying close relations with the Egyptian 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, promising them $4 billion in aid to compensate for the US 
disengagement. The fact that KSA choose to side against a fellow Sunni Islamic group baffled 
scholars and analysts alike. At a quick glance it would be more logical if Saudi had wholeheartedly 
backed the MB. A way to understand why Saudi Arabia changed their foreign policy the way they 
did, would be if a strong MB in Egypt was perceived as an existential threat to the Kingdom.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Alhussein, M.E, 2011. Reforming the religious discourse in Saudi Arabia (2011 -10). In Routledge Handbook of 
Political Islam. Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.) Routledge. p. 180. The translation of Tayyar al-Sahawi is taken from the 
source. A literary translation would be “awakening trend”.  
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1.1 Aim and Research Question 
 
The aim of this dissertation will be to highlight the historical events and issues that shaped the 
Kingdom’s policy vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood. In doing so this dissertation hope to show that 
the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia was not created in a vacuum, but rather that it was a historically 
recurrent response that finds its origin in Saudi (in)security. The research question I am 
investigating is: 
 
 How and why did Saudi Arabia change its perception of the Muslim Brotherhood from 
being a political asset to a security threat to the Kingdom? 
 
            Hypothesis, 
The hypothesis is that Saudi Arabia has strategically shifted religion from being politicized 
to securitized. 
 
 
1.2 Delimitations 
 
In order to attain a clear understanding of the underlying historical aspects affecting Saudi Arabia’s 
sense of security the period is limited to the span covering the years 1953-2014. This was a 
calculated choice as it covers the time from Ibn Sa’ud’s death and the events that followed, to the 
declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization that took place on the March 8 
2014.  
The focal point of the work has been on the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt and its 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, as such it has excluded groups that are affiliated with the mother-
organization e.g., Hamas and Jabhat al-Nusra. Even though al-Qaeda is based on ‘Qutubian’ 
teachings this dissertation will treat the group as a separate entity, as they do not represent the 
Muslim Brotherhood organization as a whole, but rather acts independently, with a separate agenda, 
from the mother-organization.    
 
 
1.3 Method and Material  
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The method of this thesis takes a historical approach in trying to understand the recent shift of Saudi 
Arabian foreign policy. Due to the interpretative nature and the phrasing of the question posed a 
qualitative method of analyzing the empirics has been chosen, as “why” is best analyzed by this 
approach.2 The stated aim of this dissertation is to examine the behavioral patterns of Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policy in order to understand the regimes historical perception of security and how this 
affected their relationship vis-à-vis the MB. According to Denscombe a qualitative analysis of data 
is concerned with interpreting and understanding how people comprehend events, and reoccurring 
behavioral patterns.3 A qualitative method is as such a natural choice for the question posed.    
    In order to analyze how the Kingdom perceives its security I will focus on relevant literature and 
articles in order to establish a baseline understanding of Saudi Arabian and Muslim Brotherhood 
history. The dissertation will then highlight events in the Kingdom’s history that displays a foreign 
policy based on the accumulation of domestic vis-à-vis international interests, placing a focus on 
issues that correlate with the political (in)security of Saudi Arabia. 
    Due to the heterogeneous nature of security as phenomena, it is implausible to attain a clear 
understanding of why an issue is seen as existential and not political when examining it as a 
separate entity. It is therefore necessary to examine the underlying factors that play a considerable 
part in shaping the security policy of the state. The aim with doing so is to accentuate recurring 
trends within the phenomena, and to depict a confluence of events.  
    The first part of the analysis will be a chronological retelling of Saudi history in order to examine 
the question “why”, by depicting the Kingdom’s historical perception of (in)security, both 
domestically and in the instances where an ideological threat has been matched with a large military 
force. The dissertation will then examine how the Muslim Brotherhood is perceived as a threat 
towards Saudi Arabia. It will do so by analyzing the origin and ideology of the organization, and the 
respective role they have played within the Kingdom in order to gain a clear understanding of the 
MB as a political asset. In order to comprehend the recent change of Saudi Arabian foreign policy 
vis-à-vis the MB it will then analyze the period covering 2011-2014 using the theory of 
securitization. However, in order to understand the recent changes it is paramount to attain a certain 
level of background knowledge on how security in Saudi Arabia perceived and shaped.  
    The empirical material in this dissertation is consistent of predominantly secondary sources in the 
form of scientific publications and articles. In order to counter the inherent weakness of secondary 
sources the author has applied a triangulation. If the empirics deviates itself from other sources it 
                                                 
2 Svenning, Conny. 1999. Method 101. Lorentz publishing. p. 71-72.  
3 Denscombe, Martyn. 1998. Forskningshandboken—för småskaliga forskningsprojekt inom samhällsvetenskaperna. 
Studentlitteratur. p. 243. 
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has been excluded in order to maintain a high degree of validity. 
    A short note on the spelling of names and places. In this dissertation, the writing will be 
consistently inconsistent. That is to say that the author has maintained a consistency in his own 
writing, but has chosen to keep quotes intact. 
 
  
1.4 Theory 
 
This study will be conducted through the theory of securitization, which is the focal point of 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The study will aim at applying the theory in analyzing the 
recent change in Saudi Arabian foreign policy towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The 
theory will thus be applied on the timespan that covers 2011-2014. Ole Wæver coined the term 
securitization in 1995, and the theory is generally seen as a symbiosis between the realist school of 
thought, and constructivism.4 Buzan explains it as “the exact definition and criteria of securitization 
is constituted intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects.”5 The discourse thus aims to examine the transformation of an issue 
into an existential security threat, which allows for the implementation of extraordinary means in 
order to maintain or establish security. 
    Security in itself is the process of taking an issue from the political sphere and placing it outside 
the scope of politics.6 The actor can do so because it argues that the threat is existential and should 
be placed above all other issues. Securitization studies tries to create a wider framework that 
expands to sectors beyond the purely traditional military-political.7   
    The task is not to assess whether a threat is objectively threatening the existence of a referent 
object; rather it is to create an understanding of what is perceived, considered and responded to as a 
threat. Ole Wӕver argues that the process of securitization is a speech act. “It is not interesting as a 
sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act.”8 Security as such is 
not a factual matter but something that has intersubjectively been declared by the actor(s) that 
instigates the speech act. However, the presentation of an issue as existential to a referent object 
                                                 
4 Williams, Michael C. 2003. Words, Images, Enemies, Securitization and International Politics, International Studies 
Quarterly. p. 512. 
5 Buzan, B. (et.al) 1997. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Pub. p. 25. 
6 Ibid. p. 23-24. 
7 Ibid. p. 195. 
8 Ibid. p. 26. 
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does not alone constitute a successful securitization. This is a securitizing move, and the issue will 
be securitized only when, and if, the audience accepts it as such. Accept in this case does not 
necessarily mean in civilized discussion; it solely mean that acceptance always rests on coercion as 
well as on consent.9 
    In order to analyze an issue through the prism of securitization, it is fructiferous to give a clear 
definition of existential threat. A threat of existential magnitude can only be understood in light of 
the particular character of the referent object. For the sake of this analysis the threat will not be 
assessed on an individual basis, where security could constitute whether one will wake up in the 
morning, or in the case of the supporter of a family if they will have bread on their table.10 Rather 
the definition will be inclusive and focused around threats that are posed against the “constituting 
principle—sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology—of the state”.11 These can be threatened by 
anything that challenges the legitimacy, recognition or governing authority of the state.  
    Any public issue can be placed within the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized; the state has no 
hand in it, and it is not part of any public debate; through politicized, government makes the 
decisions, allocates resources and the issue is part of a public policy; to securitized, presenting the 
issue as an existential threat that is outside the scope of normal political procedure.12 A successful 
securitization has three main components that all have to be present in order to constitute a 
successful securitization move. The first being the actor: the one who instigates the speech act and 
who calls out the security issue. The second is the referent object: the issue that according to the 
actor needs to be placed under protection. Thirdly, we have the audience, which needs to be 
convinced by the speech act and as such allow the issue to be securitized.13 The presence, or 
absence, of these will all have to be found throughout the scope of the paper in order to confirm or 
disprove a securitization act.  
    Several authors have over the year discussed and argued for and against the Copenhagen school 
of security studies. Its validity in the academic field of security; is it aiding a debate by widening 
what the concept of security should entice, or is it counterproductively making it too wide in order 
to gain the depth needed.  
    Realists deemed it dangerous as it opened up “Pandora's Box”14 of issues by introducing non-
military aspects into the field of security studies. Stephen Walt argued that by broadening the field 
                                                 
9 Ibid. p. 25. 
10 Bigo, Didier 2008. International Political Sociology. In Security Studies: An Introduction . Paul D. Williams (ed.) 
Routledge. p. 123. 
11 Buzan, B. (et.al) (1998) p. 22. 
12 Ibid. p. 23-24. 
13 Ibid. p. 36. 
14 Bigo, D. (2008) p. 122. 
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of Security Studies it would lessen its focus on military threats that was still highly needed. It would 
also diminish its value as a coherent field of academic study.15 By acknowledging that there are 
other actors in play besides states, it also made a slight shift away from traditional realism and its 
state-centric focus. While critical theorists have applauded the Copenhagen school for opening up 
the realm of security studies to issues beyond the materialistic and military focus of the realists. 
Others like Pinar Bilgin agree on the value of broadening the agenda but argues simultaneously that 
it has not done enough to break free from the state-centric focus of the cold war security thinking. 
The danger could, she argues, exist in using Cold War thinking in a broader agenda, as the discourse 
was characterized by zero-sum thinking with an us versus them approach and applying such 
thinking to environmental and social issues could have a calamitous effect.16 Because, if the 
broadening of security was to take place without the re-conceptualizing of agents and practices then 
measures to address them would still be carried out with traditional methods.17  
   The theory was chosen due to its relevance as a theoretical framework in the attempt to 
understand the Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia by looking at the (in)security of the actor. As the aim 
of the thesis is to examine how the state of Saudi Arabia has changed its perception of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a state-centric approach is as such already the focus of the thesis. The discourse of 
securitization tries to understand International Relations from a security perspective,18 which is the 
central part of this dissertation and will answer the question “why”. 
    Thus, this dissertation will try to analyze how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia perceives its security, 
and how their understanding of potential, and real, threats effected the choices made post-spring 
2011. 
 
 
1.5 Previous research  
 
In “Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring”19 Madawi al-
Rasheed aims to look beyond the rentier state and economic largesse dimension of Saudi Arabia’s 
                                                 
15 Walt, S.M. 1991. The renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35(2): 211-39.  p. 213. 
16 Bilgin, Pinar. 2004. Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective (Routledge Advances in Middle East 
and Islamic Studies) . Routledge. p. 32. 
17 Ibid. p. 30. 
18 Bigo, D. (2008)  p. 117. 
19 Al-Rasheed, Madawi. 2011. Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring. Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 3, (p 513-526). 
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counter-revolutionary arsenal. By analyzing the sectarian divide as a regime-employed strategy, that 
“prevents the development of national non-sectarian politics”20; she aims to highlight an often-
overlooked aspect in Saudi’s arsenal. By using a clear narrative, she elegantly portrays a Kingdom 
in which the formation of political parties and civil society is banned but the religious sphere 
remains relatively open. The mosque has thus become a platform for public mobilization. In a 
country with weak nationalism and strong Islamism, the regime employs a divide and rule strategy. 
The ruling family fosters the impression that it alone can mediate between the tribes and sects, and 
that without its efforts the security of all citizens would be threatened.21  
Her work offers a coherent insight into an aspect that is often overlooked or ignored, making this a 
valuable account of the Kingdom’s counter-revolutionary arsenal.  
In the wake of the Arab uprisings, Toby Craig Jones wrote “Saudi Arabia Versus the Arab Spring”22, 
in which he discussed the different tools the Kingdom adopted in order to maintain the status quo. 
By looking at the international, regional and domestic aspects, he manages to give a holistic 
oversight, whilst by examining the aspects individually achieving a deeper insight into the 
Kingdom’s counter-revolutionary measures.  He ties their measure to maintain the status quo with 
another imperative, to protect the Kingdom’s regional hegemony, and the advantages it gains from 
the oil-dependent global economy.23 In analyzing oil, rentier economy and the royal family’s 
largesse, he links the U.S. commitment to maintain the status quo in the Persian Gulf to the counter-
revolutionary ability of the Kingdom. Painting a picture of America as an accomplice, due to its 
fears over Iranian influence in the region.24 His work offers a great insight into the Kingdom’s 
situation and the way it dealt with them.  
Gregory Gause’s ”Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East” examines the role of the Kingdom in the 
changing landscape that was brought on by the Arab uprisings. In an elegant manner, he manages to 
portray a complex situation in a comprehensible fashion without losing the depth needed to attain a 
clear analysis. Unlike the previous authors mentioned, this work starts by questioning how counter-
revolutionary KSA really was.25 Highlighting that they supported the ousting of Muammar al-
Qaddafi, negotiated the transfer of power in Yemen and condemned the actions taken by Syrian 
                                                 
20 Ibid. p. 513. 
21 Ibid. p. 522. 
22 Craig, J.T. 2011. Saudi Arabia Versus the Arab Spring. Raritan, Vol. 31 Issue 2. (p 43-59).   
23 Ibid. p. 45. 
24 Ibid. p. 59. 
25 Gause III F. Gregory, 2011b. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East: Council Special Report . Council on Foreign 
Relations. p. 18. 
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president Bashar al-Assad.26 Another interesting aspect of the work is that it aims to go beyond 
analysing solely domestic and regional factors that kept the regime in power by including another 
layer, namely an attempt to understand why the regime acted the way it did. He attains his 
conclusions by examining what he calls “the Saudi Losing Streak”27, in which he analyses the 
Kingdom’s battle for political influence versus Iran. By looking at events in Iraq, Lebanon and 
Palestine he concludes that Saudi Arabia has come to a position where it needs to maintain and 
protect its sphere of influence.28 Thus, the first impulse in the wake of the upheavals was defending 
against the potential continuation of this “losing streak”.  
    Like T.C. Jones, he discusses the relationship between the Kingdom and U.S., but he takes a 
different approach in which he questions the relationship and argues that it has changed, as it is no 
longer “moored to the two anchors that stabilized it in the past”29, a common perspective on the 
Cold-War and U.S. operations regarding Saudi oil. He maintains that due to the growing number of 
issues on which they differentiate, it should be recognized that the “relationship is now more 
transactional than automatically cooperative”.30      
    Gause offers an alternative perspective on Saudi Arabia’s position that manages in an efficient 
manner to cover a wide array of angles, from America’s interests to domestic threats to regime 
stability.  
 
 
1.6 Background 
 
For the sake of the question posed, it is necessary to gain a baseline understanding of the origins of 
Saudi Arabia, as this will help establish a perspective on what affects the foreign policy of the state.  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia finds its roots in the mid-18th century when an alliance between 
Muhammad bin Sa’ud from the al-Saud family and the Islamic scholar Shaykh Muhammad ibn bin 
Abd al-Wahhab. The Shaykh taught a strict expansionist doctrine that was puritanical in its form. It 
fused remarkably well with the goals of the Saud family, who gained the legitimacy to conquer the 
land they had their eyes on. Al-Wahhab would give religious backing for the expansionist desires 
held by Muhammad bin Sa’ud. Together they laid the foundations for a dynastic power sharing 
                                                 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid. p. 31.  
28 Ibid. p. 32.  
29 Ibid. p. 19.  
30 Ibid.  
9 
 
alliance that is still present today. By 1932 the al-Saud family had been successful in conquering 
most of the Arabian Peninsula and established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Creating the state 
required the subjugation of diverse – religious, ethnic and tribal- groups that would all be put under 
the banner of Saudi Arabia. A kingdom named after its ruling family, with no apparent cohesive 
unity and a plurality of Islamic interpretations. As Madawi al-Rasheed described it, “The 20th 
century witnessed the emergence of a state imposed on people without a historical unity or national 
heritage which would justify their inclusion into a single entity”.31 Yet the state managed to embed 
itself into society thanks to polygamist marriages with conquered tribes, raising many of their 
former enemies to maternal kin in order to deter from dissent. This also aided in creating a 
dependency on the state, which further diminished the likelihood of disunity.32 Ibn Sa’ud’s success 
stemmed to a great deal from his ability to fuse prowess as a military tribal leader with the religious 
status from the Wahhabi order.33 By persuading and influencing the tribes to adapt the tradition and 
social outlook of Wahhabi Islam he managed to create a “communal loyalty” which in essence 
meant that their commitment to the success of Ibn Sa’ud was tied to their wish to expand 
Wahhabism.34  
    The nature of the state at this period was that of an absolute monarchy. The King made all 
political decisions regardless of size, and the institutions of government came to reflect his 
dominance. In 1953 at the time of his passing, the country lacked a constitution and government 
that could take policy decisions. As Cleveland gracefully describes it, “The Quran was the 
constitution, and the shari’ah was the law.”35  
 
 
1.7 Disposition 
 
The following chapter will examine the issues that faced the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. It is divided into five shorter sub-chapters in order to present a 
coherent, yet lucid, historical oversight. The chapter “An Islamic Monarchy Post 9/11”, examines 
the situation that faced Saudi Arabia on the onset of the Arab uprisings by looking at the in(security) 
issues present in the Kingdom from 2001-2011. Chapter four will delve into the Muslim 
                                                 
31 al-Rasheed, Madawi. 2010. A History of Saudi Arabia. 2 Edition. Cambridge University Press. p 3 
32 Ibid. p. 219. 
33 Cleveland W.L. 2008. A History of the Modern Middle East, Fourth Edition . 4th Edition. Westview Press. p 231  
34 Ibid. p. 232. 
35 Ibid. p. 452. 
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Brotherhood, and after a short account of their history and ideological foundation, an analysis of 
their role as an asset for Saudi Arabia will follow. “The Metamorphosis” will firstly aim to 
understand Saudi Arabia’s perception on the Arab uprisings, regionally and domestically. Thereafter 
it will analyse whether a successful securitization is evident, and if this in effect could explain the 
shift in Saudi’s foreign policy. Finally, the acquired results will be discussed, and a conclusion will 
be drawn in order to answer the question put.  
 
 
2 The domestic challenges of the latter half of 20th century 
 
2.1 At the brink of collapse, the reign of Ibn Sa’ud   
 
The beginning of the 50s brought with them arguably the most troubled times in the history of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Crown Prince Sa’ud was declared King after the passing of his 
father, raising his brother Faysal to the post of Crown Prince. King Sa’ud’s time coincided with 
rapid social changes that were brought on by the increase in petro-dollar and the rise of  
Pan-Arabism in the form of Nasser and Ba’ath. The changes to social and political order brought on 
by the fiscal development threatened the conservative stratums of society, from whom the ruling 
family gained the basis of its support.36 His reign as king was marked by the immense internal 
struggle for supremacy between the two brothers with the political situation at several times 
becoming so volatile that the state was on the brink of collapse.37 The newly found oil wealth did 
nothing to ease the financial debt the state had inherited from the former ruler, estimated to have 
been at $200 million at 1953. By 1958, the debt had more than doubled reaching $480 million.38 
This did not stop the lavish spending by the King, which only furthered the internal political 
struggle between the brothers. King Sa’ud continued to use the state treasury for personal 
indulgences, squandering millions of dollars. The lifestyle he chose made him into an 
embarrassment for the Royal family39, and his name came to be associated with the plundering of 
the royal treasury, palace luxury and vice. 
                                                 
36 Ibid. p. 452-453. 
37 Madawi al-Rasheed carries a more detailed discussion of the situation between the brothers. p. 106-107. 
38 Ibid. p. 107.  
39 Cleveland, W. (2008) p. 453. 
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    The battle for political supremacy created dissent in the rank of the younger princes who created 
their own block in order to get their voices heard.40 The internal rivalry between the princes came to 
challenge the patrilineal system and showed the inherent weakness of the Saudi succession.  
 Led by Prince Talal the group started oscillating between Sa’ud and Faysal shifting their 
allegiances depending on the situation. They initially supported the king, but later moved their 
support towards Faysal, who promised to listen to their demands. It did not take long before the 
group started to distance themselves politically, and they eventually proposed the creation of a 
National Council, a consultative rather than legislative assembly.41 Talal’s propositions were largely 
ignored, and he was dismissed from government in 1961. He then moved to Cairo and Beirut where 
he started the royal opposition group, al-umara’al-ahrar, the Free Princes, with the aim to create a 
Constitutional Monarchy in Saudi Arabia. The group was influenced by the current trends in the 
Middle East, especially Nasserism which at the time was seen as an ideological threat to the 
political security of the Kingdom. In a time where regional upheaval was amok and instigated by 
the Free Officers the threat of dissent in the state was perceived as real. Saudi Arabia at the time did 
not have the capability to educate officers; as such, the threat of a military coup was minimal. 
Instead they had the Free Princes who were heavily influenced and openly advocated socialism, 
Nasserism and a Constitutional Monarchy.42  
    This internal struggle continued until 1962, when Faysal, in the absence of the King,43 formed a 
cabinet. The new government included stout followers of the Crown Prince and excluded the sons 
of Sa’ud. The King deemed this unacceptable and at the time of his return he threatened to mobilise 
the Royal Guards against his brother. Faysal then ordered the mobilisation of the National Guard 
against the King, in effect forcing him to abdicate.44 The abdication meant the end to the infighting 
that had threatened to destroy the kingdom from within.  
    This period in Saudi history displays the issues that come with their patrimonial succession. As 
the line to the throne is not clear it allows for political manoeuvring in order to (de)stabilise the 
reign. The dissent in the form of the Free Princes depicts a monarchy in which the ruling family is 
fractured, and does not make out a cohesive unit. The strong ideological pull from Socialism and 
Nasser came to influence them, and helped shape their ideological stance. In a time when the King 
was struggling and losing influence vis-à-vis Nasser and Pan-Arabism, the dissent from within his 
                                                 
40 Al-Rasheed, M (2002) p. 109-110. 
41 Yizraeli, S. 1997. The Remaking of Saudi Arabia, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle East and African 
Studies. p. 112. 
42 al-Rasheed, M. (2002) p. 112. 
43 King Sa’ud was currently out of the country for medical treatment, something that often correlated with domestic 
turbulence.  
44 al-Rasheed, M (2002) p. 114. 
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own family was a political blow that the Kingdom could not afford.  
 
 
2.2 The politicization of religion, the reign of Faysal  
 
 Faysal’s reign (1964-1975) came to transform Saudi Arabia in more ways than one viz., 
educational system, militarily and the regional stature of the state. He adopted the notion of 
modernisation within an Islamic framework, and used religion to distinguish himself from his 
“corrupt” brother.45 Saudi Arabian media started displaying his piety with pictures of the King 
praying in mosques attempting to portray him as the “authentic Muslim king.46 The informal 
alliance between religion and the state came to be formalised during the reign of Faysal. By 
granting the senior members of the ‘ulama47 posts as state functionaries he efficiently co-opted the 
religious institutions. His elegant use of religious identity enabled him to become the champion of 
Islam and granted him immense legitimacy both domestically and regionally. This would reach its 
peak with his fateful decision to participate in the oil embargo of 1973. This decision transformed 
the Kingdom into an international economic powerhouse.  
    During a time when technological innovations and the changes to society that came with them 
threatened to create a divide between the religious conservatives on the one hand and the king’s 
wishes to modernize Saudi Arabia on the other, Faysal strove to incorporate the ‘ulama into the 
state and started to reward the more modern of them, those who were willing to endorse his reforms 
to gain concessions.48 This period was marked by the regime consolidating the politicization of 
religion, and the process of institutionalizing the religious identity, making it synonymous with the 
piety of the royal family.     
  
 
2.3 Balancing regional interest: threat perception of a desert Kingdom  
 
KSA’s foreign policy has been based on accommodation and the maintenance of balance of regional 
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interests.49 The Kingdom was aversive to become part of the region's balance of power as they 
realized that they could not possibly build a competitive military despite huge spending on 
armament. After the oil embargo of 1973, they attained an unmatched economy and the influence 
that comes with it. The conduct of Saudi Arabian foreign policy came to reflect this. While their 
perceived enemies went for a more hard-liner approach, building military arsenals to balance the 
power of the other, the Kingdom used the oil revenues and religious legitimacy to become a major 
player in regional politics.  
They used the obtained wealth partially to finance religious groups in other countries. e.g., America 
and Saudi Arabia donated an estimate of $40 billion dollars to Afghanistan during the Soviet 
invasion.50 This was an attempt to bolster the Mujahidin fighters and build religious schools to 
spread Wahhabi Islam. They actively supported the “front-line” Arab states in their conflict with 
Israel, from the Khartoum Conference through the 1973 war.51 During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia “compensated” regional and international allies for their support against Iraq.52  
 Saudi’s balance of regional interests has been based on their perception of the potential threat that 
states pose against the domestic security of the regime.53 The greatest threat being from states that 
possess a strong military power coupled with a political legitimacy that attacks the political security 
of the Saudi regime. During such circumstances, there is little room to doubt whom they will 
balance against, as will be discussed further below. The more interesting cases are the ones where 
the source of the threat is a bit muddled. One state could pose a potential threat due to the superior 
military power they possess, while another could be an ideological threat and openly hostile against 
the Saudi regime but materialistically weaker. When this is the case Saudi Arabia has adopted a 
strategy of balancing against the ideological threat, and has repeatedly shown that they perceive it 
as the worse of the two. This claim finds its validity in reoccurring assessment of threats and 
allegiances in which the Kingdom has engaged.  
    The Kingdom has since its creation feared the Hashemite families and their influence. Partially 
due to their bloodline that is traced back to Prophet Mohammad. The bloodline and the fact that the 
tribe originates from the Hijaz area gives them a legitimate right to the holy sites that Saudi Arabia 
does not enjoy. Through the 1940s and 1950s, they were on bad terms with the Hashemites in Iraq 
and Jordan. King Abdullah the ruler of Transjordan harbored dreams to create an Arab land 
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consisting of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, commonly known as the Fertile Crescent.  54  This 
would make them far too powerful in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, because of this they were perceived 
as a mortal enemy. Therefore, they could not deal with them on the basis of a community of 
interests. The threat from the Hashemite family disappeared in 1958 when Brigadier Abd al-Karim 
Qasim staged a bloody military coup in Iraq, successfully overthrowing the Hashemite regime.  
In the 1960’s and 70’s they sided with the shah of Iran against the Ba’ath regime in Iraq, even 
though Iran had the clear military advantage between the two. In the war between Iraq and Iran, 
they sided with the militarily stronger Iraq against the revolutionary Iran, again due to the perceived 
threat of an opposing ideology. “Hussein’s secular Baathist regime was regarded as a threat to the 
Saudi kingdom, but Iran, with its goal of spreading its Shia Islamic revolution throughout the 
region, was judged as the greater evil”55  
    The rise of Nasser in Egypt was a clear threat to Saudi political stability. Even so, in the 
beginning Saudi Arabia chose to side with him against the Hashemite family in Jordan and Iraq, 
signing a mutual-defense treaty with Nasser in 1955. This was mainly a counter-reaction to the 
Baghdad Pact,56 which Iraq just joined in order to counter their rising influence.57 With the fall of 
the Hashemite family in Iraq the threat perception of the royal family changed. Nasser and his calls 
for pan-Arabism became the new threat towards the royal family. His charismatic speeches and 
calls for Arab unity gave him followers and sympathizers all over the Arab World. The relationship 
between the two states came to a peak with an Egyptian invitation to train Saudi officers. Later this 
turned out to be a mistake, as the recruits became indoctrinated, shifted allegiances and tried to 
stage a coup in 1955.58  In 1956, Nasser was invited to Saudi Arabia to discuss a proposed union 
that would include the two countries and Syria. His arrival was met with high levels of popular 
support, something that gave off warning signals to Faysal and Sa’ud.59 The relationship between 
the two states soon started to deteriorate, as Nasser’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, which Saudi Arabia had continued to support, his call for Pan-Arabism and the anti-
imperialist rhetoric displayed a relationship that was doomed to fail.60  A Lebanese newspaper 
revealed that King Sa’ud had given a Syrian officer a check for £1.9 million to have him assassinate 
Nasser. The failed attempt coincided with his rising popularity after the Suez Crisis, and only 
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further deteriorated the public image of Saudi Arabia.61  
    The divide between the two states culminated with the 1962 coup in Yemen. Inspired and 
executed with support from Nasser, the officers led by Abdallah al-Sallal overthrew the monarchy 
and proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic.62 Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the former monarch, 
managed to flee north where he started gathering support by rallying tribes. The conflict escalated 
into a proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom’s fear was that the notion of a 
republic state would spread through the Gulf, and as such it became a major security concern for the 
ruling elite.63 A few Saudi Arabian pilots defected while on a mission to supply the royalists, and 
flew to Egypt where they asked for asylum. One of the pilots claimed that there was a coup 
underway in the Kingdom, just waiting for the right moment to rise up against the regime. The 
Saudi leadership temporarily grounded all air traffic in order to stop more deserters from leaving the 
Kingdom. 64  
    The perceived threat from Nasser was deeply rooted amongst the elite, especially after the 
formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. The death of Nasser in November 1970 
shook the foundations of Egypt and sent ripples throughout the Middle East. For the Kingdom’s 
royal family it removed an ominous shadow that had for a long time been looming over them. 
    Saudi Arabia understood early on that they could never become a regional hegemon, and their 
foreign policy has come to reflect this, as they balanced the regional players in order to block them 
from achieving hegemony. It perceived threats not based on military capabilities and materialistic 
grounds, but rather on ideological differences and challenges to the ruling family’s right to govern.  
 
 
2.4 Trouble at the oasis: domestic dissent and state repression  
 
This fractured society that was placed under the al-Saud name has in comparison to the region been 
fairly unscathed from domestic dissent. This however does not mean it has been completely free 
from it. During the Hajj in November 1979 a small group, numbering an estimated 3500, of armed 
men seized strategic positions on the road between Mecca and Medina. Lead by Juhayman al-
Utaybi a former officer in the National Guard and inspired by Wahhabist teachings the group, the 
Movement of the Muslim Revolutionaries of the Arabian Peninsula (MMRAP) soon controlled a 
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major area between the two cities. The majority of the men came from the Ikhwan tribe65, and 
served in the National Guard. A number were locals and foreigners that studied at the prestigious 
University of Medina, and were active members in the Muslim Brotherhood organization. The 
group split up in two and left for each of the cities. While the government troops in Medina 
defeated the men that came their way, the forces in Mecca were caught off guard and an estimated 
200 to 1000 revolutionaries sized the main mosque. The Saudi deputy Prime Minister Prince Fahd 
ordered an assault on the mosque that would last for two weeks. The incident ended without any 
official casualty figures ever released.66 The siege of Mecca revealed an inherent susceptibility in 
the regimes use of religion to gain political legitimacy, as they could be charged with impiety. 
During the seizure of Mecca the MMRAP widely accused the royal family of corruption. The 
frivolous and offensive lifestyle some of the princes lived contradicted the Islamic principles the 
ruling elite used to claim their legitimate right to govern. The loss of political legitimacy could have 
a potentially devastating effect, as it makes out the basis for the mutual relationship between the 
‘ulama and the ruling family.67 
    Just two weeks later unrest began amongst the Shia in the eastern province. The events coincided 
with the celebration of Ashura68 that the government had since long banned within the Kingdom. In 
order to quell the demonstrations taking place the government dispatched 12,000-20,000 men from 
the National Guard. In February the year after, 1980, Shias took to the street to perform observance 
but found military men sent to keep them in. This sparked three days of anti-government protests 
that manifested itself by the burning of banks, and military barracks.69 The events coincided with 
the Islamic revolution in Iran, and their early calls for exporting the revolution. Inspired by the anti 
Sa’ud propaganda from Teheran, the uprising convinced the ruling family that an Islamic Iran 
represented a serious threat to the political legitimacy and domestic security of Saudi Arabia.70  
  
 
2.5 A new security landscape  
 
The 1990s altered the source of the domestic threat towards the ruling family, having for a long time 
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been from secular sources such as Nasserism or supporters of Ba’ath, towards religious based 
dissent.71 The last 20 years of enhancing the salafi movements inside the Kingdom had increased 
the religious belief in a pure Islamic state. This has proven to be both positive and negative for the 
state as it helped them to contain secularist tendencies, and spread sectarian strife in the Kingdom. 
However, it also made them vulnerable to pressure from religious sources. 
    The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait showed the citizens of Saudi Arabia that the immense arms 
spending undertaken was inadequate; instead, they had to depend on American, “infidel”, troops to 
defend their country. This provoked a high level of criticism from more conservative clerics. In 
1990 a leading Islamic scholar concluded that the true enemy was not Iraq, but rather the West and 
America.72  The criticism from the religious stratums of Saudi Arabia was not as easily suppressed 
as the secular opposition had been, due to the royal family’s dependence on the ‘ulama for 
legitimacy. Thus, the “age of petitions” started, where reform petitions calling for reforms were sent 
in from both the moderate side and the more conservative, within the Kingdom.73 The pressure 
eventually leads to three reforms in 1992: the Basic Law of Government, the Law of the 
Consultative Council, and the Law of the Provinces. The Law of Government reaffirmed the 
monarchy and the religious grounds on which the Kingdom was based. The law emphasized the 
state as an Islamic monarchy in which only the ruling family had the right to govern.74 
The Law of Consultative Council established that a consultative council should be created, and 
outlined the role it was to play. They were to interpret laws, and examine reports on orders from the 
government ministers.  The Council did not have the power to create laws on their own and was to 
work only in a consultative capacity. The Law of the Provinces aimed at creating more oversight 
into the dealings of the provinces, as they had been largely autonomous until the creation of the 
law.75  
    Religious pressure from within the Kingdom hence forced them to undergo reforms to a certain 
degree. Whether these reforms actually managed to attain the proposals put forward or were simply 
an attempt to quell the critics, they highlighted the vulnerable state which the country was in at the 
time. The ruling family felt that they had to accede in some form, in order to maintain their status. 
The beginning of the 1990s brought with them memories of the exiled opposition from the 60s and 
70s, with one major difference. The new dissent was an indigenous response with an Islamic 
rhetoric. An increased clamp marked the time of petitions down on dissent also marked the age of 
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petitions, with more surveillance, intimidation and enforcement of bans on criticism.76 This 
escalated in 1994 with the large protest against government corruption and immorality known as the 
Buraida Uprisings. A reported 1300 people were arrested, including a number of clerics and 
preachers. The uprising took place in the homeland of al-Saud and as such represented a dangerous 
estrangement from its traditional loyalists.77 The crackdown was followed by fatwas threatening to 
retract their rights to preach and lecture unless they stopped. This however did not lessen the 
amount of dissent, and led to more arrests of the senior ‘ulama. Eventually the severe punishments 
that the government enforced without leniency started to quell the opposition. This however would 
change in 1995 when the government executed a conservative activist. The response was a number 
of attacks on government and U.S. installations and personnel. In the aftermath of the first Gulf 
War, around 20,000 American troops were positioned on Saudi Arabian soil. This led to the two 
bombings that took place in 1996 of American personnel. The more destructive of the two killed 19 
US soldiers, and injured more than 500.78  
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3 An Islamic Monarchy post 9/11 
 
The 21th century has thus far proven to be a challenging one for the Kingdom. The attack on World 
Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 drastically changed the position of the state vis-à-vis America 
and the West. The Kingdom managed to outride the issues that they were faced with, but not 
without pressure from both international actors, mainly U.S., and domestically. This however does 
not mean that they were without risk to their political stability. The following chapter will examine 
the (in)security of Saudi Arabia during the years from 2001-2011. It will do so in order to depict the 
vulnerability the regime felt on the onset of the Arab uprisings.  
 
 
3.1 Reforms 
 
The September 11 attacks put severe pressure on Saudi Arabia, the fact that 15 out of the 19 
hijackers were of Saudi origin and that it was masterminded by Osama bin-Laden, a fugitive 
terrorist from the Kingdom, put the ruling family in a position where they had to accede with the 
demands of the West and carry out reforms in many areas connected to the religious establishment; 
such as the role of women and education.79 The reform proposals were originally rejected as the 
problems were perceived as foreign. The fact that America was openly pushing for an active reform 
movement in the country did not aid this sentiment.80 Demands were made regarding increased 
oversight of charitable organizations as they were used to funnel money to terrorist networks. In 
November of 2001, a survey that was carried out by the ministry of the Interior on educated Saudi 
men between the ages of 25 to 40 showed that 90 percent of the respondents expressed varying 
degree of support for bin Laden.81 The government of Saudi Arabia thus faced pressure for two 
directions. From America, the backer and ally of the regime, and from a domestic scene that were 
empathizing with the enemy of the west.  
    Coupled with this are the recent calls for reform of the religious establishment in the country. 
These reformative trends would have been impossible a decade ago, and the process depicts the 
domestic need to acknowledge the diversity among the Saudi Arabian population in terms of the 
plurality of religious and sectarian beliefs. Saudi Arabian society had previously ignored the many 
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levels of diversity by advancing a religious and cultural homogenous identity. As such the most 
important components for social and cultural development is to acknowledge pluralism in faith, 
race, ideology and tribe.82 One of the more prominent ways the reforms has manifested itself is the 
foundations of Al-Hiwar al-Watani (the National Dialogue), which is held annually in the Kingdom. 
The events hosts different speakers every year discussing a wide range of topics, and 
acknowledging, at least in name, the notion of a pluralistic society. 
    We witnessed here a reoccurring trend of the ruling family having to accede to pressure from 
religious elements in order to maintain a harmony with the root of their political legitimacy. Being 
the protector of Sunni Islam grants them immense political legitimacy, but it also makes them 
susceptible to pressure from the religious establishment.  
 
 
3.2 Unemployment  
 
The Government of Saudi Arabia suffers from tremendous challenges domestically due to the 
changing financial situation amongst the population. In the beginning of the new century, an 
estimated 70% of the Saudi population was under 25 years and the unemployment rate among them 
was around 30%.83  The major issue that posed is that the economy is growing at a much slower rate 
than the population and the government has not managed to produce enough jobs to match the 
growth.84 This has led to what we recently have seen on the news; the mass expulsion of migrant 
workers. Two million workers were set to be expelled from the Kingdom in order to open up job 
opportunities for the domestic market.85 This “Saudization” plan does little to change the situation 
among the local population as the vast majority of the people expulsed worked menial jobs that the 
Saudis have shown a reticence for, whilst the European and Western workers still remain. 
According to IMF 1.5 million of 2 million of the new jobs created in the last four years went to non-
Saudi nationals.86     
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3.3 Succession 
 
In October 2011 Crown Prince Sultan, the minister of defence and heir died, raising the prickly 
issue of succession yet again. The deteriorating health of King Abdullah, who at the time was 
eighty-eight and recovering from back surgery that had keep him outside of the country for three 
months. Prince Nayif, the minister of interior and at the time seventy-eight, took over the position 
of crown prince. The current generation in power are the sons of the founding King, and while there 
still is someone from this generation to take over the throne will likely be stable.87 Problems will 
arise as the position will go to the second generation, as there is no clear rule for how the throne 
shall be passed on and the amount of potential claimants increase. As history has shown us, the 
internal family disputes have been a great source of insecurity for the royal family, and has 
highlighted the fact that the royal family does not act as a cohesive unit. The fear according to 
Gregory Gause is: “the possibility of a late-Soviet-style set of aging rulers, dying in quick 
succession, looms.”88  
 
 
3.4 Domestic Terrorism 
 
In 2003 al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) launched a wave of violence in the Kingdom. 
The attacks lasted until 2007 when the group had essentially been wiped out, even though smaller 
cells continued to act out minor attacks across the country.89 During that time the group carried out 
approximately 20 to 25 operations within the Kingdom. The main goal of QAP was to attack 
western targets, which could be seen in the objects of their attacks. Three out of five car bombs; 
nine out of 12 assassinations; and four out of five shootings were directed towards western targets.90 
Captured militants from QAP purportedly said that the vision of the leadership was a two-stage 
campaign; the first to mobilize the Saudi people for a jihad against the crusaders, and a second in 
which they would turn the masses against the al-Sa’ud family.91 Their tactic did not however yield 
the desired effect, as the Saudi population as a whole did not mobilize, but rather grew appalled at 
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the group due to the tactics they deployed. The decline in support for extremist actions was 
accelerated when Muslim children, woman and elderly people became the targets.92 
    The Saudi regime’s ‘diversionary politics’ in which they promoted pan-Islamism in order to 
export their domestic revolutionary forces had an unexpected blowback. An approximated 55% of 
the QAP members - likely higher - had previous jihad experience from abroad.93 It was not until 
after the QAP campaign started that the regime dared to take measures against the pan-Islamist 
sentiment that was prevalent in the country.94  
    From 2003, the Kingdom designated all the time and funds needed in order to combat domestic 
terrorism. If they could have been said to be complacent in their position before, this all changed in 
May that year.  Four suicide car-bombs were set of in the middle of Riyadh killing 34, including 
eight Americans. In the aftermath clerics were instructed to condemn the attacks, and the Saudi 
regime started a major crackdown on domestic terrorism. The amount of resources that were 
allocated for counterterrorism was immense: The security budget for 2004, 2005 and 2006 was 
estimated to have been at US$8.5, 10 and 12 billion respectively.95 Even though the campaign was 
successful, the first two years of attacks claimed the lives of 221 people.96 
    In 2007-2008 the government arrested hundreds that were suspected to try and revive the militant 
cells. By this time the clampdown on clerics preaching an extremist interpretation of Islam had 
amounted to the discharging of over a 1000 imams, and in March of 2008 Saudi Arabia announced 
its plans on retraining the remaining 40.000 imams in efforts to aid the battle against militant 
Islamism.97  
    While none of the issues above is by themselves prominent enough to be a real threat to the 
stability of the regime, they display the difficult situation that the Kingdom experienced in the 
period leading up to the Arab uprisings. In order to understand the insecurity of the ruling family in 
the onset of the revolutions of 2011 it was thus important to assess the domestic security, as this will 
enable us to understand the volatile situation rom which they instigated the securitizing move.   
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4 The Muslim Brotherhood 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood was one of the most well established and largest Islamic organizations in 
Egypt until it was dissolved on October the 9th 2013. Founded in 1928 by the schoolteacher Hasan 
al-Banna, the organization managed to go from a minor group originating from a small city along 
the Nile to leading the country in which it had been persecuted throughout its turbulent existence.  
The main goal of the MB was the creation of an Islamic republic governed by Sharia. The way to 
achieve this was by the Islamisation of society. The group had a history of being in opposition with 
the Egyptian regimes. As such, its history is filled with persecution and violence, but also with 
accommodation and varied levels of political participation.  
    In the last few decades the group came to change its approach, and emphasised the importance of 
working within a democratic system and denounced violence as a means towards achieving their 
goals. Having no legal status in Egypt made them engage in the social activities, and influenced the 
country through active engagement in social movements and the civil society. The Arab uprisings of 
2011 came to change their position radically, launching them into mainstream politics in Egypt. 
With the Freedom and Justice Party winning a landslide election under the auspice of the MB, 
positioning their candidate as the first, post authoritarian, elected President. A year later, the 
President was ousted and shortly after the MB was classified as a terrorist organization which 
eventually lead to them being dissolved.  
    In order to understand how the MB constitutes a threat towards Saudi Arabia, the following 
chapter will aim at building a baseline understanding of the origins, structure and ideological goals 
of the Brotherhood. 
 
 
4.1 History   
 
In the year of 1928 in the Suez Canal city of Isma’iliyya a secondary school teacher named Hasan 
al-Banna created what would come to be known as The Muslim Brotherhood (Jam’a al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimin). With Isma’iliyya as its base, the group rapidly started expanding its influence to the 
lower middle and a quickly growing working class in the cities. Four years later, 1932, the group 
moved its headquarters to Cairo, and shortly thereafter the first branches in the capital cities of 
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neighbouring countries were opened.98 By the end of the decade, the organization had 500 branches 
throughout Egypt, and a membership that numbered in the tens of thousands.99  
    From its origin the group characterised itself as a movement pursuing reform under the auspice of 
Islam. The group’s initial goal was to reform the religious education, but due to the volatile political 
situation in Egypt during the constitutional monarchy and the looming presence of British 
colonialism veered it on the path towards a social movement. In this initial phase of the 
organization they stood out for their anti-British sentiment and a staunch opposition against the 
political parties in Egypt.100  
    Analogous with Egyptian movements of its time, the MB created a paramilitary unit independent 
and separate from the mother organization. The group known as al-Nizam al-Khass (Special Unit), 
headed directly by Hasan al-Banna and operated as a well-structured military organization. The 
increasingly volatile political situation during the last years of the monarchical rule radicalized the 
organization and they were responsible for carrying out a number of terrorist actions, one of the 
more prominent being the murder of the Prime Minister in 1948. This action would be the impetus 
for the assassination of Hasan al-Banna, which took place a few weeks later in January 1949.101 The 
murder of the Prime Minister led the government to dissolve the MB and concomitant with the 
death of their leader this brought the organization to the brink of collapse. It took two years until the 
group felt secure enough to appoint Hasan al-Hudaybi as the successor. According to one author, 
this was a choice the leading circle took in order to avoid “tackling internal frictions and put off 
fundamental discussions on the MB’s strategic and ideological direction.”102 Al-Hudayabi came to 
lead the group for two decades through the precarious situations that were to come.   
His leadership co-occurred with the coup d’état carried out by the Egyptian Free Officers. The 
relationship between the Brotherhood and the new regime was originally good, which could be seen 
in that they were the only group that was exempt from the law that dissolved all political 
organizations103, and they were invited to take part in the shaping of the new government. Even so, 
the internal conflicts in the group and al-Hudayabis lack of support from within the organization led 
to a gradual decline in their relationship with the Revolutionary Command Council.104 The 
relationship ended when the MB was accused of the attempted assassination of Nasser in 1954. The 
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regime retaliated with executing six of its leaders and imprisoning thousands.105 This marked the 
beginning of “the time of persecution”106, which lasted almost 20 years during which thousands of 
members would be thrown in jail.107   
    The years the organization would spend in prison came to be a critical time in the evolution of the 
Brotherhood. These were the years when Sayyid Qutb would create his revolutionary ideology, and 
raise the fundamental question whether it was legitimate to support a regime, directly or indirectly, 
that had left the path of Islam. The implications of his teachings came to be significant. They led to 
the offshoots of the MB that would condone acts of terror in order to achieve their goals. Eventually 
this would lead to the arrest and execution of Qutb in August 1966.108 As a reaction to the June War 
in 1967, the Egyptian MB would come to split. The part of the organization that relinquished 
violence kept the name “the Muslim Brotherhood”, and the offshoot groups that adhered to Sayyid 
Qutbs ideology created smaller organizations such as al-Hijrah and al-Jihad.109 It was followers to 
the teachings of Qutb that would later in 1981 assassinate Anwar al-Sadat, and that the year after in 
Syria would attempt to overthrow the President.110  
    With sudden death of Nasser in 1970 and the appointment of his successor Anwar al-Sadat, the 
Egyptian regimes policy towards the MB would radically change. The new president declared an 
amnesty with the aim of gaining the support he needed in order to push through economical and 
foreign policy related changes.  
    The Brotherhood denounced political violence and veered towards a path of working within the 
legal and political framework. The end of persecution meant that al-Hudaybi, and his successor, 
‘Umar al-Tilmisani, could start rebuilding the organization’s strength.111 The new President allowed 
the MB more freedom, he did not however lift ban of 1954. This left the organization in a 
precarious situation as the group was caught in a legal ambiguity, which it came to have until the 
uprisings of 2011. They were not allowed to engage in politics as a party, and as such had to run 
individual candidates.  
    The initial relationship between the state and the MB did not radically change when Mubarak 
came to power. The status quo did not however last, as the group’s continued attempts to affect 
society through informal networks and social movements led to increasing resentment and 
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eventually from the mid-1990s persecution.112 The Brotherhood who originally had been at the 
forefront of militant Islamism, now represented a moderate centrist political movement. Even 
though religious parties were banned from creating political organizations, the MB ran individual 
candidates in the parliamentary elections with varied results.113 In the 2005 parliamentary elections, 
the group enjoyed a landslide success and won almost 20% of the seats.114  
 
 
4.2 Ideology 
 
There is a continuing debate regarding the ideological basis for the modern MB, specifically, 
whether the group condones violence as a means, or strives towards democratic political 
participation. The discussion is closely linked to the theological framework and different ideological 
interpretations.115 
    Regardless of the many leanings within the group, what they all have common is the belief in the 
teachings of the founder Hasan al-Banna. He visualised the Brotherhood as a movement that fused 
social, political personal and religious matters. The MB started as a movement of individual reform 
of social and moral aspects, but grew to be an all-encompassing ideology. It believed that Islam had 
deteriorated under Sufism, and the continued intrusion of West and its values. The cure was to be 
found in going back to the true teachings of Islam, and to incorporate it in every aspect of one’s life. 
Creating an Islamic state based on Sharia was to have an impact on all layers of society. Women 
were to be educated and allowed to work, but some social distance should be maintained. The 
economy too would be reformed to reflect principles deducted from the Qur’an. 116 His view 
however, was not simply to resurrect the past. He argued that Islam had always been compatible 
with modernity and as such sought a way to take full advantage of the new technology without 
strafing from the values of Islam.117 The organization grew up as a revolutionary movement striving 
for change. As Hasan al-Banna said: 
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If you are told that you are political, answer that Islam admits no such distinction. 
If you are accused of being revolutionaries, say, ‘we are voices for right and for 
peace in which we dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against 
us or stand in the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend 
ourselves against your injustice.118 
 
The most challenging time when analysing the Brotherhood’s ideology is the prison years of 1954-
1971. During this time, the debate within the group took place on a theological field. It was during 
these years that Sayyid Qutb wrote his Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones Along the Way) which 
predominantly is associated with terrorism and radical Islam. While it is undeniable that Qutb’s 
teachings has been the inspiration for a number of radical groups, it is paramount that one does not 
reduce his influence to solely these organizations.119  
    Followers of Qutb’s ideological framework broke off from the Brotherhood in 1967 and created 
terrorist groups throughout the 1970s. These groups were adherents to the teachings of hukm Allah 
(wisdom of God), jahiliyya (paganism) and jihad, arguing that the world could be divided into two 
categories, true Islam and the enemy.120 In his texts, he wrote that in order to continue to develop 
modern Islamic thought it was necessary to exclude foreign influences. The rulers were too 
incorporated in his ideology. They were to enforce morality, to uphold a just society. This included 
the distribution of wealth, which would be used for the betterment of society. “Wealth should not be 
used for luxury or usury, or in dishonest ways, it should be taxed for the benefit of society; the 
necessities of communal life should not be in the hands of individuals, but owned in common.”121 
 The document Du’at la Qudat (Preachers not Judges) was written by the Brotherhood’s leadership 
under Hasan al-Hudaybi as a counter-narrative to the teachings of Qutb. The book outlined a 
principal theological base that stemmed from Islamic law. Thus, it managed to give the organization 
a framework that al-Banna and later Qutb had been missing in their texts.   
The following decades would revolve around gradually building a strategy for its position regarding 
political issues. Among these are how the Brotherhood should view economic liberalization, 
privatization and whether it should participate in elections. In all of these issues the MB adopted a 
moderate stance that left the revolutionary goals of their past behind, and veered towards a 
democratic participation.122 Even so, there is a tendency within the Brotherhood to define the group 
as a social movement that works in constant opposition with the regime, on the basis that beliefs 
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cannot be submerged in order to further a political agenda and that the groups should not alter its 
policies based on the membership.123   
 
 
4.3 Political Asset  
 
The relationship between the MB and KSA has generally been good; in fact, in the 1950s the 
Kingdom sheltered thousands of Brothers fleeing repression from Nasser’s Egypt. The Kingdom 
and its newfound oil wealth was in dire need of educated people in their workforce, and MB 
members helped serve this cause. They took positions as lawyers, engineers and teachers in the 
emerging educational system, effectively entrenching themselves with the Saudi society and 
state.124  
    Nasser’s aggressive regional policy in the region helped the build-up to the “Arab Cold War” 
which was played out by proxy forces in Yemen by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It was during this time 
that the MB members took refuge in the Kingdom thus creating an alliance between the two main 
opponents of pan-Arabism; the domestic one—The Muslim Brotherhood, and the regional one—
Saudi Arabia.125  
    According to Stéphane Lacroix, the increased influence of the MB helped politicize religion in 
KSA and led to the emergence of Islamic groups known as Sahwa.126 Thought these groups bore 
varying levels of affiliation with the MB organization, one went so far as to call itself, the Saudi 
Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimun al-saudiyyun), yet they did not swear to the general 
guide in Egypt.  
    The relationship between the organization and Kingdom would remain good in the following 
decades, during which the MB established themselves and came to dominate the intellectual scene. 
Fusing the ideology of Sheikh Abdul Wahhab and teachings of the MB, leading to what is known as 
the Tayyar al-Sahawi (religious awakening). This doctrine established itself as the dominant one, 
and led to that the intellectual discourse for the last 30 years to become “static” owning to the overt 
domination of MB thought in the Kingdom. 127 
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The first adversity that faced the relationship came in the 1990s, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
A number of Sahwa branches openly criticized King Fahd’s decision to place American troops on 
holy soil, and started to demand radical reforms. The government responded with a crackdown that 
by 1994-5 had effectively crushed the campaign. A sign that the Saudi family saw the Sahwa and 
the MB as intrinsically linked is that they expelled several prominent MB exiles, among them 
Sayyid Qutb’s brother Mohammad who taught at a university in Kingdom. 
    The relationship between the two normalized, but the state never forgot the dissent that had come 
from the Sahwas. After the 9/11 attack KSA’s religious establishment came under immense 
international pressure as 15 out of 19 hijackers was from the Kingdom. Wahhabism came under 
scrutiny as it was said to be breeding extremists. In an attempt to protect its version of Islam the 
then interior minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud denounced the Brotherhood, saying it 
was guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and openly accusing them of being "the source 
of all problems in the Islamic world” 128 in an attempt to demonize the Brotherhood.  
The next few years would ease the tension between the two and the Sahwa became reintegrated into 
Saudi society, in exchange for not criticising the regime. This was not merely a sign of a more 
accommodating stance by the government, but also an attempt to utilize an existing framework to 
gain legitimacy.129  
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5 The Metamorphosis; the transformation of a Brotherhood 
 
The act of securitizing an issue is a move made out of insecurity, a sense of weakness, and not from 
a position of strength. “Security and insecurity are the results of the process of securitization, or 
more adequately: (in)securitization.”130 Therefore, in order to effectively analyse Saudi Arabia’s 
political shift vis-à-vis the MB it is paramount to understand that the policy was not created in a 
vacuum, but rather that it was a confluence of events. Hence, this chapter will firstly examine the 
situation that faced the Kingdom in the onset of the Arab-uprisings. It will then examine whether a 
securitization has been successful, and, if it was, how this affected the mutual accommodation 
between the Kingdom and the Brotherhood.   
 
 
5.1 Regionally  
 
Both domestically and regionally, the Kingdom has showed great counterrevolutionary sentiment. 
With the fall of leaders in Egypt and Tunisia, unrest in Yemen and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia started 
feeling asphyxiated and did not hesitate to engage in counterrevolutionary measures. No more so 
than in Bahrain, its eastern neighbour. The country of Bahrain’s is predominantly Shia Islamic, 
governed by a Sunni Monarchy that has showed unwillingness to open up for reform. The events of 
2011 produced great anxiety for the ruling elites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The fall of a friendly 
autocratic regime in Egypt pushed the royal family to take action in order to stem the domino effect. 
Soon 1,500 men from the Saudi National Guard entered Bahrain to clamp down violently on the 
protesters. In the time that followed thousands of protesters were arrested, disappeared, tortured and 
dozens were killed.131  
    The Kingdom effectively showed that no diminishment in the power of a monarch would be 
permitted. The protection of the status quo became paramount for the Kingdom that attempted to 
get in front of revolutionary movements in Yemen and Syria, and lending its support to the 
monarchies in Morocco and Jordan. In an ad hoc manner inviting them to join the GCC, without 
regarding their geographical position, with great financial benefits for the two kingdoms.132  
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5.2 Domestically  
 
The Kingdom felt a surge of unrest on its domestic scene, and fears that the spring would take root 
led to moves designed to decisively clamp down and crush those inclined to campaign against the 
ruling family.  
    The Kingdom shared several of the deficit areas that characterised the countries in which the 
revolutions took root. Among these were socio-economic disparities, a high level of unemployment 
and problems with integrating the new generations of workers. There is an immense gap between 
those who were well off and those who were not. Recent reformative trends in the Kingdom with 
calls for more elective government and a reform of the religious establishment. This coupled with 
an abhorrent democratic deficit.  
     The confluence of issues led to an insecurity that had to be addressed. Thus, King Abdullah 
started a heavy spending spree in the country in an attempt to quell potential dissent. With the spree 
amounting to $130 billion in domestic incentives to keep the revolutionary ideas away.  The biggest 
share went towards a housing project, where the King announced a plan to build five hundred 
thousand new houses over the coming years and to make it easier to receive housing-loans. The 
incentive also included a onetime blank payment amounting to two months’ salary for all 
governmental employees, military personnel and retirees. The minimum wage was increased for the 
people working in the governmental sphere, alongside the introduction of unemployment 
benefits.133 
    With the onset of potential dissident in the Kingdom, the ruling family played a familiar hand in 
their attempts to pre-emptively disrupt the spring breeze, the clergy. The ‘ulama shared the ruling 
family’s desire to maintain the status quo, whilst “preventing the realization of democratic 
transformation”. 134 Thus, in early 2011 the grand mufti, the highest religious position in the 
country, labelled the demonstrations taking place in the Arab world as “destructive acts of chaos” 
incited by the enemies of Islam.135 Just a month later the Council of Senior Clerics, the highest 
religious body in the Kingdom, released a statement declaring demonstrations as forbidden.136  
This method of Saudi counterrevolutionary approach has long been the part of the Kingdoms 
political and military arsenal in curbing unrest. Toby C. Jones describes it, 
 Saudi politics has been based on outmanoeuvring calls for political 
transformation, on preserving a system of political economic privilege…and on 
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unleashing the forces of radicalism and sectarianism to insure the survival of the 
Kingdom’s ruling clique.137 
 
With the onset of the Arab revolutions, the Sahwa movements saw their chance to make a political 
stance, and published several open petitions requesting reforms. A number of esteemed and leading 
Sahwa figures signed these, and in March 2013 Salman al-Awda, one of the signatories, sent an 
open letter to the King continuing the requests made earlier.138 The apparent backing of the reform 
movement by the Sahwa reawakened the King’s fears. Thus, when an Islamic regime came to 
power in Egypt the Saudi regime dreaded that this would make their own Islamist groups feel 
emboldened.  
    With the ousting of President Mursi in Egypt, the Saudi regime’s position became even more 
perilous. Throughout the summer, the major Sahwa figures in the country made statements and 
signed petitions denouncing the coup. Mohammad bin Nasir al-Suhaybani held a sermon in the 
Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, cursing the supporters of the coup and declaring that the bloodshed is 
on their hands.139 This generated a hashtag that quickly gained popularity (“Shaykh Suhaybani 
represents me”) concomitant with the hashtag “King Abdullah's speech does not represent me” 
which started seeing use after the King held a speech in which he strongly endorsed the ousting 
of President Mursi.140 On August the 8th 2013, 56 sheikhs, some known to be affiliated with the 
Saudi Muslim Brotherhood, denounced the “removal of a legitimately elected president” and 
claiming that those who partook were “taking part in committing a sin and an aggression forbidden 
by the laws of Islam”141  
 
 
5.3 Securitizing religion 
 
These episodes were perceived as the realization of the regimes worst fears. A domestic group, with 
ties to their regional counterpart, feeding of each other and challenging the political legitimacy of 
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the Saudi state was a threat with saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects. The 
regime’s response came on February the 4th 2014, when a royal decree was released stating;  
 belonging to intellectual or religious trends or groups that are extremist or 
categorized as terrorist at the local, regional or international level, as well 
supporting them, or showing sympathy for their ideas and methods in whichever 
way, or expressing support for them through whichever means, or offering them 
financial or moral support, or inciting others to do any of this or promoting any 
such actions in word or writing142  
 
Doing so would result in a prison sentence “of no less than three years and no more than twenty 
years.”143 The speech act had been instigated by the regime with a royal decree endorsing the 
designation of the MB as a terrorist group. It also forbade people from expressing any form of 
sympathy for the group whilst at the same time functioning as a threat to similar entities. 
 The campaign against the ideological threat would peak a month later when the regime on March 8 
released a list of all the groups the Kingdom perceived as terrorist groups, among them the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The declaration continued by stating that all groups deemed similar in action, word 
and ideology would also be treated as terrorists.144  
    The object of the speech act was the Kingdom’s source of political legitimacy, namely religion. 
There are three major reasons why the referent object is religion and not the ruling family or regime 
(the actor). Firstly, the referent object is predominantly another entity besides the actor, due to the 
difficulty in justifying the protection of oneself. 145 Hence the securitization of another, in this case 
religion. Secondly, scholars have for a long time tried to analyze the religious and cultural aspects 
of the Kingdom separately from the political. This Eurocentric perspective of analyzing the 
Kingdom is faulty, as the religious and political identity go hand in hand and have been inseparable 
since the creation of the state.146 Thirdly, and chiefly, the perceived threat is posed against the 
political legitimacy of the regime and not against the regime as an entity. Even though the insecurity 
stemming from the threat is with enough salience to be perceived as existential against not only the 
regime, but also the political security of said regime. This could be seen in the MB (and Sahwa 
groups in anyway affiliated with the organization) gaining the same threat classification as al-
Qaeda. The king’s message was clear, zero tolerance for anyone who use Islam in order to pursue a 
political agenda.  
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Thus far, what we have witnessed is the securitizing move by the actor, but a securitizing move 
does not constitute a successful securitization. The last component required in order to compose a 
securitization is the audience accepting the issue as a threat with enough saliency to legitimate 
extraordinary measures. But, as Buzan (et.al) describes it: “accept does not necessarily mean in 
civilized, dominance- free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as 
on consent.”147 An acceptance taking this form could be found in the “day of rage” where more than 
34.000 people had on an anti-government Facebook page showed support for protests that were to 
take place in Saudi Arabia on March 9th 2011.148 The day was to be a call for change in the 
Kingdom. The protests that were to take place never materialised. A combination of religious calls 
deeming protest as un-Islamic, recent crackdown on protesters where two people were shot, and a 
large presence of coercive force on the day in question effectively quelled the protests.149  
    The hashtags (see chapter 5.2) that gained popularity after the King endorsed the ousting of 
Mursi could be seen as a rejection of the securitizing move, as part of the public explicitly stated 
“King Abdullah’s speech does not represent me”. However, in the immediate aftermath of the 
speech a hashtag campaign was launched declaring “the King represent me”, with the Saudi press 
declaring it a big success. Whether this was an attempt the state made in order to portray a people in 
harmony with the royal family, or it was an actual –non-state supported—campaign the facts remain 
the same; the Kingdom has taken extraordinary measures in declaring the MB a terrorist 
organization and be it by coercion or consent the audience has accepted the move. The Kingdom 
has thus, in this case, achieved a successful securitization of their source of political legitimacy, 
namely religion.      
 
 
5.4 Politicized and securitized: asset and/or threat 
 
In the 1950s and 60s when the MB arrived in Saudi Arabia they were an invaluable asset to the 
Kingdom for several reason; the rapidly expanding educational system was in dire need of teachers 
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and the immigrating Brothers came to fill this need. The ideological threat that was posed by Nasser 
was countered by King Faysal’s elegant use of Islamic rhetoric. The role as the protector of Sunni 
Islam that KSA held in the regional arena was further enhanced by the Kingdom accepting the 
Brotherhood’s refugees and accommodating them in society. The ruling family’s ability to call upon 
the Sahwas when in need of further legitimization in the face of a religious issue has been a 
constituting principle of the organization as an asset. 
    The last 40 years of enhancing the salafi movements inside the Kingdom has increased the 
religious belief in a pure Islamic state. This has proven to be both positive and negative for the state. 
It helped them to contain secularist tendencies, and spread sectarian strife in the Kingdom. While 
lately, some salafists has shown support for an electoral government, which is a major step away 
from the old label of “un-Islamic”.150 The idea of active participation of salafi groups in politics is 
however a major concern for the ruling family, as they have continuously justified its lack of 
democracy on their interpretation of Islam. 
    The mutual accommodation between the MB and the domestic religious ideology was possible 
when the Brotherhood was not in a position to pose any form of threat. Nevertheless, with the 
organization coming to power in Egypt they were immediately perceived as a potential threat 
towards the Sunni hegemony that Saudi enjoyed. Simultaneously with this came the calls for reform 
from the Sahwa movements who were associated with the MB, openly questioning the regime’s 
actions regarding the coup in Egypt. The simultaneous pressure from two sources—Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood and the domestic Sahwa movements—lead to the regime securitizing religion 
in order to maintain the primacy of the ruling family and its interests.   
     If the Muslim Brotherhood then gained power through an electoral system in Egypt, was allowed 
to sit a full elective period and had showed that its ideology was a functioning way to an Islamic 
state, it would devastate the ideological power that the Kingdom has. This would in effect render 
Saudi sentiment about being the sole protector of Sunni Islamic values moot, and displays that it is 
possible to merge Islamic and democratic values. A strong Muslim Brotherhood would as such be a 
threat to the Saudi regime’s ideological power, hence a threat to their survival.  
 
 
 
                                                 
150 Gauze, G. (2011b) p. 20. 
36 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
Saudi Arabia changed its perception of the Muslim Brotherhood due to the perceived ideological 
threat they posed towards the political security of the regime.  
At a quick glance, it would perhaps have been seemingly more logical if Saudi Arabia had sided 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, this dissertation has attempted to look beyond the 
initial shift of policy and examine the historical insecurity of the Saudi regime, and how this 
correlate with their foreign policy. The finding was a Kingdom that perceived ideological threats to 
the supremacy of the ruling family as decisive security issues.  
    By examining the events that took place in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, we identified the 
components needed in order to constitute a securitization move, and by looking at the reaction of 
the audience, we observed a successful securitization. Thus, the dissertation proved the hypothesis.  
    By applying the theory of securitization, this dissertation analysed how Saudi Arabia altered its 
perception of the Muslim Brotherhood under politicized and later securitized religion. In a 
politicized religious environment, the Brotherhood brought with it a number of beneficial elements 
and as such functioned as an asset for the Kingdom. They aided in building legitimacy for the 
regime, and acted as way for the ruling family to assert influence in the regional arena. With the 
securitization they became a liability to the supremacy of the regime, as they threatened the 
religious hegemony of the al-Saud family.  
    The findings in this dissertation correlate to a high degree with those of Gregory Gause. Saudi 
Arabia’s regional balance of power act cannot be reduced to a materialistic balance of power. Rather 
they have walked a line of managing internal and international interests to maintain a status quo. 
However, there is a sense of insecurity that has driven the foreign policy of the regime, which is 
derived from their historical perception of threats.  
    The theory of Securitization was a valuable asset in analysing the recent changes in KSA’s 
foreign policy. It brought with it a framework that granted a new lens through which to analyse the 
situation. The strength of the theory could also be said to be its weakness, namely, that it is focused 
solely on the shifting issue in the moment it is transformed from a politicized issue towards a 
securitized. Hence, the theory pays no heed to why an issue is seen as existential, or whether it 
really is. It exclusively examines the process of making security, and not the underlying factors that 
are the cause for the need of securitization.    
   Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain its security interest due to immense oil wealth, and 
ideological legitimacy deriving from religion. While several studies have been done regarding the 
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security of oil, dollar diplomacy and there is an apparent lack on religious security and its 
implications. This dissertation makes the claim that Saudi Arabia has securitized religion in order to 
protect its political legitimacy. By adding this dimension into the field of security studies, in the 
case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we broaden the scope of what security as an academic field 
can constitute. This opens up new layers of potential analysis. What impact will securitization have 
on the religious identity in the Kingdom? How will this affect the sectarian divide in the Kingdom? 
Questions like these could potentially be the basis for future studies.  
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